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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT K. BENCH,

]

Plaintiff-Appellant/

]
]'

-vs-

Case No. 860414

BECHTEL CIVIL & MINERALS, INC., ]
Defendant-Respondent.

]

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues to be presented for review are whether the
facts give rise to an accord and satisfaction.

Plaintiff-

Appellant claims they do not, because there is no evidence of
a consent or agreement by Plaintiff and that the circumstances
from which the trial court found such accord and satisfaction
cannot be construed to constitute such consent or agreement
in view of the Utah cases that state emphatically that such
determination must result from declarations of such a clear
nature as to assure that the parties are aware of the extent
and scope of such agreement.
STATEMENT OF THF CASE
Plaintiff brought an action to recover "uplifts" or
compensation promised to him by his employer pursuant to a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

written contract.

At the suggestion of Judge Conder, and

pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the deposition of
Plaintiff-Appellant, which the Defendant had taken, was pub4
lished, and the matter was argued to the court without further
testimony.

The trial court found there was an accoird and

satisfaction because Plaintiff and Defendant had agreed that
Plaintiff's contract could be completed in 18 months instead
of the 24 months provided for and because of other factual
circumstances.

The trial court granted Defendant judgment of

no cause of action, and Plaintiff appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TC ISSUES FOR REVIEW
One of the facts Appellant is anxious to bring to this
court's attention is that there are no facts developed by the
testimony of witnesses in open court and tested by the fire of
cross examination and by rebuttal testimony.

There was a depo-

sition taken of Plaintiff-Appellant, and the pertinent documents
were exhibits to that deposition.

Defendant then made a motion

for summary judgment that was scheduled for hearing shortly before the trial setting.

At the time set for that hearing the

deposition was published by agreement of both parties.

The

court (Judge Conder) then proposed that the matter be continued
to the trial date and argued at length at that time and, further,
that the parties stipulate that the matter could be considered
on the deposition and the pleadings and memoranda contained in
the file, so that it would be unnecessary for either party
to bring witnesses on the trial date.

Eoth parties agreed,

and it was so ordered.

-

*
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While Appellant admits that he agreed to that procedure, it is important to note that the agreement was proposed
by the court under circumstances that made it difficult not
to agree;

that Plaintiff-Appellant was deprived thereby of

the opportunity to present his witnesses, his story or his
facts.

(In deposition Plaintiff only answered Defendants

counsel's questions; he did not present his own facts.
Plaintiff's counsel, knowing that Plaintiff would be available at trial, had no incentive or reason for volunteering
Plaintiff's story in deposition.)
While Plaintiff-Appellant appears to be complaining,
he agrees not only that he agreed to that procedure, but that
it was reasonable and did not affect the outcome (the facts
that Judge Conder relied on to reach his conclusion—that
there was an accord and satisfaction would not have been
changed by a formal trial.)

The important point is the

trial court was not advantaged by its observation of the demeanor of the witnesses.

The Supreme Court can read the

pleadings, memoranda and deposition of Plaintiff-Appellant
in the same way and to exactly the same advantage as the trial
court could.
To the extent possible, Plaintiff-Appellant wants to
make this a one-point Brief, that point being that Judge Conder erred in finding an accord and satisfaction, because
Plaintiff-Appellant never agreed to it.
basis of the trial court's decision.
the judgment must be reversed.

That was the sole

If that is in error,

Accordingly, this recitation

of facts Digitized
willby the
include
only
the J.facts
on the accord
Howard W. Hunter
Law Library,
Reuben Clarkbearing
Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and satisfaction issue.
There is a written contract.

It is straightforward.

It is entitled "Recital of International Employment Conditions."

It is Exhibit 4 to Plaintiff's deposition (R-194)

It provides in addition to a basic wage or salary for what
are entitled "uplifts."

They are:

1.

Foreign Service Premium

7.5% of base salary

2.

Special Service Area
Allowance

7.5% of base salary

3.

Hardship Premium

15

% of base salary

4.

Completion Allowance:
After one year
Subsequent years

17
25

% of base salary
% of base salary

Thos "uplifts" were not paid as agreed.
£.194, page 56, line 21).

(Deposition

Defendant Bechtel, by its repre-

sentatives, called a meeting of all affected employees in
Jubail, Saudi Arabia at which it announced by an oral presentation that the completion allowance would be reduced for the
first year from 17 per cent to 8 per cent and for subsequent
years from 25 per cent to 15 per cent; the Foreign Service
Premium of 7.5 per cent would be eliminated, and the Special
Service Area Allowance would be eliminated (Deposition R.194
at page 49, beginning at line 18 to page 51, line 6).
Plaintiff Bench objected at that time by asking the
question, "What if I don't want to accept?"
page 52, lines 6-15)

(Deposition R.194

Plaintiff was then advised to "Go talk

to Ray Portlock," the project manager.

As Plaintiff attempted

to talk to Portlock, a new letter was distributed indicating
there would be a new package of documents to sign outlining
the new Digitized
payment
programs.
Shortly
thereafter
by the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark
Law School, BYU. a second general
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

meeting of affected employees was called by Ray Portlock at
which it was announced that the new package of documents
would not be sent out.

At that meeting Plaintiff objected

and asked "What would happen to those of us who didn't want
to continue, but had not yet met our 18-month duration for
the tax exemption?" to which Portlock responded "That option
to leave would be open to all of those upon completion of
their exemption."
pages 52 to 56.

(General narrative is at Deposition R.194,
Specific question and answer of Portlock is

at p. 56, lines 6-15).
After Plaintiff had completed the 18 months required for
his foreign service tax exemption, he wrote a letter to Portlock asking for confirmation of his options regarding early
completion. (Deposition R.194, Exhibit 12)

Thereafter Plain-

tiff's supervisor, a Max Nezam, relayed Portlock's response
agreeing to Plaintiff's contract completion as long as it was
after January 1, 1983 so that Defendant would have time to
find another person to fill Plaintiff's position. (Deposition, R.194 at pages 66 and 67)

Plaintiff then wrote a letter

to Nezam confirming that conversation and requesting contract
completion as of January 31, 1983.

It was in that letter that

he indicated "It has been a pleasure working with you in the
audit group here at Jubail, and I would look forward to working with you in the future.

I appreciate your help and con-

sideration in this matter."

(Deposition R. 194, Exhibit 13)

Plaintiff further testified in his deposition"that he
discussed with Nezam his feeling that the Defendant Bechtel
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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could not legally cut wages specified in a contract;

that

Bechtel was taking advantage of its employees1 circumstances
where they were serving in a foreign country so far from
home and that while Plaintiff enjoyed serving with Nezam,
Plaintiff's total reason for leaving was the decrease in
pay.

(Deposition R. 194 at page 101, line 10 to page 103,

line 14. Also page 67, lines 10-14)
As Plaintiff checked out from his employer, he received
a document entitled "Handpays" which contains a statement "net
final wages from job 11967/Jubail."

Plaintiff signed that

document on a line that says "Check and COSI card received by
(signature Bench)

."

(Deposition R. 194, Exhibit 15)

Plaintiff also received and negotiated a final paycheck which
included on a stub, which was intended to be torn off before
the check was negotiated, the statement "In settlement cf net
final wages from job 11967/Jubail."

(Deposition R. 194, Ex-

hibit 18) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUM1NTS
There is only one argument presented which is that the
trial court erred when it found an accord and satisfaction
absent any evidence of agreement or consent by Plaintiff;
and especially absent any delcaration of such a clear nature
as to assure that Plaintiff was aware of the extent and scope
of such claimed accord as required by the Utah cases.
Plaintiff also objected to certain of the Findings on
the ground that they did not conform to the evidence.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT—POINT I
THERE COULD NOT BE AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF NEVER
AGREED TO THE MODIFICATION OF THE
UPLIFTS IN QUESTION.
It is clear that Plaintiff left his employment
with Defendant because of the attempted unilateral
decrease in the "uplifts."

Judge Conder's Memoran-

dum Decision recites Plaintiff's statement to his
supervisor Nezam that his total reason for leaving
was the decrease in pay.

It is also clear that there

was a dispute about whether Defendant could change the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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contract unilaterally.

Plaintiff testified that he ques-

tioned "whether his employer could legally cut wages specified in a contract" in that same conversation with Nezam.
The court noted "that both sides concede there is a dispute"
to which Defendant agreed.

(R. 232 transcript, p. 37, line

25 to p. 38, line 1)
By the terms of the contract, Defendant could have terminated its contract by giving one-month's written notice of
assignment completion.
1)

It did not do that.

(Deposition R. 194, Exhibit 4, item
It could have obtained new mod-

ified employment contracts from its employees by mutual agreement.

It started to attempt that, but backed off when em-

ployees objected.

Accordingly, the contract for the origin-

al uplifts was still in effect when Plaintiff left his employment unless it can be said that he agreed to the changed
uplifts by accepting the reduced contract completion time
(from 2 4 months to 18 months) or that he agreed to the changed
uplifts by receipting for the "Handpays" document or by negotiating his final check, or unless it can be said that he
agreed to the changed uplifts by failing to object more strenuously or unless such agreement is indicated by his pleasantries expressed to Nezam when he said in his letter that it v/as
a pleasure working with Nezam and that his request to leave
was not related to his job assignment. (Deposition P.. 194,
Exhibit 13)
This court has declared that accord and satisfaction is
an affirmative defense and requires the party alleging it to
-7-
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meet burden of proof as to every necessary element.

Meg-

sick v. PHD Trucking Services, Inc., 615 P2d 1276 (1980)
In that same case this court declared
..that to effect an accord and satisfaction, payment must result from declarations of such a clear nature as to
assure that the parties are aware of
the extent and scope of such agreement.
Plaintiff-Appellant urges that Defendant's agreement
to reduce the contract completion time,provided Plaintiff
would stay until Defendant could get his replacement was a
reasonable thing for both parties to agree upon.
both of them.

It helped

Defendant, having the burden of proof, has

offered no evidence that that agreement was linked to Plaintiff's acceptance of the reduced uplifts.
is available.

No such evidence

Certainly there is no declaration of such a

clear nature as to assure that Plaintiff was aware of the
extent and scope of the claimed agreement, as required by
Messick.
The receipt on the "Handpays" document was similarly
just that:

a receipt for a document.

The negotiation of

the final check did not require Plaintiff's acquiescence
in the statement contained thereon as in the case of provision for endorsement that says something like "endorsement or acceptance of this check constitutes payees agreement that it is payment in full, etc."

It is simply a

statement of the maker of the check that it regards the check
as a settlement of final net wages.

That portion of the

check was intended to be torn off before it was negotiated.
Plaintiff knew that Defendant claimed the check was in setDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tiement of net final wages, but he was not asked to agree
with that statement and did not agree with it.

The Utah

case of Hintze v Seaich, 20 Ut 2d 275, 437 P2d 202 (1968)
is squarely in point.

The court held in an almost exact-

ly similar situation that:
/3*. . . Mr Williams cashed this check
and denies that the cashing thereof
constitutes an accord and satisfaction.
We agree with him. In a Am.Jur.2d,
Accord and Satisfaction § 15, it is
said:
The principle that an offer of
payment of a lesser sum in discharge
of a greater will result in a discharge of the indebtedness only if
the offer is made upon the condition
that the creditor accept the offered
sum in full satisfaction of the indebtedness, finds frequent application in the case of checks and other
remittances. The mere fact that
the creditor receives a check or
other remittance from his debtor
for less than the amount which the
creditor claims, with knowledge
that the debtor claims to be indebted
to him only in the amount paid, does
not result in an accord and satisfaction; the debtor must also indicate that payment is offered upon
satisfaction or not at all, or the
circumstances must be such as to
clearly indicate to the creditor that
it was sent with that intention.
Consequently, where a check is
tendered, even though it accompanies an account, if there is no exT pression of the condition that it
must be accepted in full payment, the
r acceptance of the check does not constitute an accord and satisfaction,
as no agreement to that effect can
be implied from the transaction.
So too, the mere payment by a debtor
of an amount denominated "a balance"

-9-
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upon an account rendered and
its retention by the creditor
does not constitute an accord
and satisfaction.
There is another point:

Plaintiff had no dispute with

Defendant about his wages; it was his "uplifts" (Defendant's
term per the contract) that Plaintiff disputed.

Again, see

the Messick case cited above which says:
3.

Accord and Satisfaction
Since voucher which was attached
1
"
to check and which stated"This is the
balance of your account in full"
did not state that the check was to
be returned if it was not so accepted,
it was clear that there was no meeting
of minds that acceptance of the
check by former salesman was to be
in complete settlement of dispute
with former employer as to commissions
owed, and accordingly, former salesman's cashing of the check did not
constitute an accord and satisfaction.
and the Hintze case to the same effect.
Judge Conder seemed to be concerned about Plaintiff's
failure to object more strenuously and at every opportunity
and about the pleasantries contained in Plaintiff's letter to
Nezam.

While unexpressed, it seems to be a concern that

Plaintiff lulled Defendant to sleep; took advantage of Defendant's offer to reduce the completion allowance period; and
than brought suit after Plaintiff was safely returned to his
home in Utah.

A couple of observations:

First, the offer

to reduce the completion allowance period was offered to all
of Defendant's employees.

When Plaintiff attempted to con-

firm it, it was specifically conditioned on Plaintiff's staying until Defendant could get a replacement.

So it was mu-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tually advantageous.

The amount paid was based on 18 months

pay and not 24 months pay, so it was anticipated compensation and not extra compensation.

That was only fair and,net

generous,in view of the fact that it was Defendant's attempt
to unilaterally modify the written contract that caused
Plaintiff's early departure.

Defendant would have been re-

quired to "complete" Plaintiff's contract, had it given the
required one-month's notice of termination thereof, as required by the very first numbered paragraph of the contract.
That completion would have included payment of Plaintiff's
expenses to return home and other like expense.

It is not

as though Defendant had a right to strand Plaintiff in Arabia
if he did not concur in Defendant's attempted unilateral
change of the contract.

More importantly/ Defendant was the

author of the contract and provided for the means of terminating it.

In truth, the contract and the uplifts continued

until Plaintiff left Arabia.

The suggestion that little

Plaintiff took advantage cf big Defendant by allowing that
contract to continue without reminding Defendant that it
was so continuing because it had not been terminated in
accordance with its terms, is incongruous and reaches toward
ludicrous.
Defendant's announced intention to require all employees to sign substitute agreements and its later withdrawal and retreat from that position indicates that it was
Defendant and not Plaintiff that was trying to seduce the
other with silence.

(Most of Defendant's employees merely

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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accepted Defendant's unilateral change without complaint
without realizing that it was contrary to the terms of their
contract which continued until modified.)
Lastly, Plaintiff's attempt to be pleasant by telling
Nezam that it had been a pleasure working with him was only
an effort to conduct himself as a gentleman.

Plaintiff

wanted to tell Max Nezam that it was not because of him that
Plaintiff elected to leave and to reinforce the point that
it was the instant dispute that caused the split and not anything else.

There was never a question but that Plaintiff

disputed Defendant's attempted unilateral modification of
the contract.

It was not necessary for him to repeatedly

reaffirm it by reminding Defendant that he could or that he
intended to bring suit to resolve that dispute.
Plaintiff claims that the basis of Judge Conder's
error is an assumption by the Judge that an accord and satisfaction can be inferred from circumstantial evidence and
especially that it can be inferred from silence.

This Court

has taken great pains to announce that there is no such thing
as an accidental or unintended accord and satisfaction.

By

Plaintiff's count, six of the last ten accord and satisfaction cases over the past 20 years have taken pains to describe that basic principle in fresh terms.
discussed the Messick and Hintze cases.

I have already

The other 4 cases

and their approach to the point are as follows:
A

*

Sugarhouse Finance Co v. Anderson 610 P2d 13 69
(1980) wherein the court recited as an essential to its validity :
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(3) . . an asset or meeting of the
minds of the parties.
B.

In Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, 560 P2d

1383 (1977) the Court held:
[3] An accord and satisfaction is a method
of discharging a contract, or settling a
claim arising from a contract, by substituting for such contract of claim an agreement for the satisfaction thereof, and the
execution of the substituted agreement.
To constitute an accord and satisfaction
there must be an offer in full satisfaction of the obligation, accompanied by
such acts and declarations as amount to
a condition that if it is accepted, it
is to be in full satisfaction, and the
condition must be such that the party
to whom the offer is made is bound to
understand that if he accepts it, he
does so subject to the conditions imposed,
.
The accord is the agreement and
the satisfaction is the execution or
performance of such agreement. . . .
[A] This new, substitute agreement must
be founded upon a legal consideration and
must be consummated, by the assent or
meeting of the minds of the parties, to
the agreement.
C.

In Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining Co.,

535 P2d 1228, the Court held:
[4,5] . . . The authorities dealing with this
problem, including those cited and relied
upon by the defendant, uniformly affirm
that it must clearly appear that the
parties so understood and entered into
a new and substitute contract. To state
the matter in traditional contract
language: that there was a definite
meeting of the minds on such an agreement.
D.

In Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Ut

2d 186, 417 P2d 761 (1966)

the Court observed that taking a

check that bore the statement "Payment in full of the account
below.

Endorsement of check by payee is sufficient receipt."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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did not constitute an accord and satisfaction where there was
known to be a dispute.

The Court said "The dispute negates

any accord."
Of those 6 cases, 3 reversed the decision of the trial
court, and 3 affirmed.

Three were also "Master and Servant"

cases/ and 3 were not.
In the instant case there is no evidence of Plaintiff's
consent to the reduced "upliftsf" let alone informed consent
or consent evidenced by declarations of such a clear nature
as to indicate that Plaintiff was aware of an intended accord
and satisfaction.

What really happened is that Defendant

attempted to bully through an unilateral change.

The claimed

accord and satisfaction is an afterthought.

ARGUMENT—POINT II
SOME OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE ERRONEOUS
While Plaintiff believes the accord and satisfaction
argument above is pivotal and the basis of this appeal, Plaintiff feels compelled to complain about the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law as a matter of housekeeping.

The Find-

ings were signed by Judge Conder on June 26, 1986.

Judge Con-

der retired as of the end of June, 19 86.

Plaintiff believes

June 26th was his last day in his office except June 29th
when he came to participate in a farewell party.

Because of

those time constraints, it was impossible to obtain a hearing
on the Findings and Judge Conder signed the Findings as proposed by Defendant, without change.
Plaintiff
complains about Finding of Fact, number 9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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wherein it said, "Plaintiff accepted the new package of
benefits" because it infers a voluntary acceptance.

There

is nothing in the record that supports a claim that Plaintiff voluntarily accepted the new package of benefits.
Plaintiff further complains of that portion of Finding
number 9 that finds that Plaintiff "received the return to
point of origin benefits. . . which under his original employment conditions he would have been entitled to only upon
the completion of 24 months of employment," because it is inaccurate.

Plaintiff would have been entitled to "return to

point of origin benefits if Defendant had terminated his contract on one month's notice." In short, Plaintiff would have
been entitled to those benefits if the contract was terminated
or modified by Defendant without Plaintiff's consent for any
reason.
Plaintiff objects to Finding of Fact number 11 because
it says Plaintiff acknowledged receipt of his "net final wages
from job" where in fact Plaintiff only acknowledged receipt of
the handpays document that contained a statement about "net
final wages."
Plaintiff objects to Finding of Fact number 13 because
it infers that Plaintiff received the full relocation allowance and other return to point of origin benefits that were by
contrast payable only if he worked 2 4 months whereas he would
have been entitled to those benefits if the contract was terminated or modified by Defendant without Plaintiff's consent,
for any reason.
-15--
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Plaintiff objects to Conclusion of Law number three,
because it is superfluous.

The truth is Judge Conderfs

Memorandum Decision is an accurate and probably a complete
record of what he decided.

It appears to Plaintiff that

Judge Conder decided that there was an accord and satisfaction and that that resolved the matter.

It would have

if the accord and satisfaction was not disputed.

CONCLUSION
Defendant had the burden of proving an accord and satisfaction.

It did not prove,either directly or by reasonable

inference, an agreement by Plaintiff to the modified uplifts.
Certainly it did not prove declarations of Plaintiff of such
a clear nature as to assure that Plaintiff was aware of an
agreement to the modified uplifts.
The agreement provides for the uplifts in question.
has never been modified either by agreement of the parties
or pursuant to its own terms.

Accordingly, the uplifts in

question are still owing by Defendant to Plaintiff.
Judge Conderfs decision that there was an accord and
satisfaction should be reversed.

The matter should then

be referred to the trial court for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

A^~&c

$ 'rf-<~.u.~.

GERALD E. NIELSON
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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It

Served four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief upon
hd

hci - u-e /1 ve Hit* 1/

Defendant-Respondent by mailing same to its attorney,
James L. Warlaumont, CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON, 200
American Savings Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84101 this rffc day of October, 1986.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT R. BENCH,

:

Plaintiff,

:
MEMORANDUM DECISION

VS.

:
CIVIL NO. C 83-4178

BECHTEL PETROLEUM, INC.,
a Nevada Corporation,

:

Defendant.
At

the

trial

evidence and

••uplifts

this

argued the

additional monies
defendant.

of

case

issues.

due him

parties proffered their

Plaintiff claims

Essentially he claims that the contract
on

base

salary.

compensation"

Completion

claim for

spent

this .

provides for

for foreign service premium of
area allowance

incentive

depending upon the time

that he has

under an employment contract with the

7.5% of base salary and special

makes no

the

as

was

a

percent

adjusted

(TR 104)

of 7.5%
of

but

of base

base salary
the pliantiff

Other "uplifts11 were also

provided but the plaintiff stipulated that he did

not assert any

claim except for those above.
After plaintiff

was in

the defendant advised the
were being

adjusted in

voiced concern about the

Saudi Arabia for about seven months

plaintiff that

percent and
change but

some of

the "uplifts"

some eliminated.
took no

Plaintiff

affirmative action

(TR 101). Plaintiff testified:
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BENCH V. BECHTEL

Q:

Do

PAGE TWO

you

believe

that

MEMORANDUM DECISION

you communicated to anybody in

Bechtel Corporation your dissatisfaction with that change and the
fact that

that was

the reason

for your

leaving, and if so, in

what way?
A:

Yes.

I had a very candid discussion with my supervisor,

Mr. Maz Nezam.
I enjoyed

As I set forth in my letter, I had no objections.

the service

with him.

But

I had

discussed that my

total reason for leaving was the decrease in pay.
Approximately eleven
his services and returned
from Saudi

Arabia the

months later
to the

(TR 103)

the plaintiff terminated

USA.

Prior to

his departure

plaintiff reviewed the final figures and

acknowledged receipt of his "net

final

wages

from

job..." and

cashed the check for the sum specified.
In the

"package11 of changes was a change in the "completion

incentive" which allowed the plaintiff to
prior to

the 24 month date.

take "contract complete"

Plaintiff accepted this by a letter

dated November 10, 1982, in which

he made

no objections

to any

changes or reductions in pay and stated:
"It has been a pleasure working with you in
the Audit Group here at Jubail and I would look
forward to working with you in the future.
I appreciate your help and consideration in
this matter."
This court

finds that there has been an accord and satis-

faction.
Judgment granted to the defendant, No Cause of Action.
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BENCH V. BECHTEL

Defendant to

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

prepare Findings, Conclusions and Judgment and

submit same to plaintiff's attorney for approval as to form.

Dated this

1

day of June, 1986.

?
-r ._<*
/

DEAN E. CONDER
DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies mailed to each counsel.
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Steven E. Clyde (0686)
James L. Warlaumont (3386)
CLYDE & PRATT
Attorneys for Defendant
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-2516

jUN&MSaS

%

i t t Court

-o^oST

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH

ROBERT K. BENCH,
Plaintiff,
VS.

:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

s

BECHTEL CIVIL & MINERALS, INC. , :
Defendant.

*

Civil No. C-83-4178

TRIAL OF this action came on regularly before the Honorable
Dean E. Conder, District Judge, sitting without a jury, on May
27, 1986, at the hour of 10:00 a.m.

Plaintiff was represented by

his counsel, Gerald Nielsen; Defendant was represented by its
counsel, Steven E. Clyde and James L. Warlaumont.

The parties

agreed that the existing record before the Court, including the
affidavit

of Patrick Morgan and the Deposition of Robert K.

Bench, would be proffered as the entire evidence and both parties
then proceeded with closing argument on all issues joined by
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant's Answer and Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

a PRATT
Y« AT LAW
:AN OAVINOS
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The Court, having considered the pleadings, the parties1
stipulations and the evidence, and now being fully advised in the
premises and good cause appearing, makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1*

Plaintiff Robert K. Bench is a Utah resident.

2.

Bechtel Civil and Minerals is a Nevada Corporation that

does business in Utah and elsewhere.
3.

On or about March 30, 1981, Plaintiff and Defendant

entered

into

conditions

at

an

employment

that

time,

relationship.

including

The

Plaintiff's

employment
compensation

package, were set out in a Recital of International Employment
j; Conditions, a Tax Letter and Employment Conditions —
4.

Jubail.

Plaintiff worked as an employee of Defendant from May 1,

1981 until January 31, 1983.
5.

The compensation package originally provided for certain

uplifts on a base salary, including a foreign service premium of
7.5%

of

base

salary, a special area allowance of 7.5% base

salary, a hardship premium and a "completion-1 incentive paid
annually based on a percentage of base salary paid that year.
The compensation policy also provided that Plaintiff would be
eligible to receive certain benefits after twenty-four months of
employment
incentive

and on
uplift

an annual, basis
for

the

thereafter,

second year

of

including

the

employment, accrued

vacation, return transportation to the United States, shipment of
household effects and allowances for relocation.
i
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;
V

6.

In August, 1981, after

Defendant,

the

United

Recovery Tax Act

States

(ERTA)

Plaintiff

Congress

began

enacted

to work for
the

Economic

(H.R. 424, 97th Congress; Public Law

97-34) that took effect on January 1, 1982 and altered the tax
structure upon which the compensation package was based.
7.

Defendant revised its compensation policy in light of

the Economic Recovery Tax Act and adjusted
eliminated others.

some uplifts and

The package of changes also included a change

in the completion incentive which allowed Plaintiff to terminate
and receive return to point of origin benefits, including a pro
rata completion

incentive, prior to completion of twenty-four

months of employment.
8.

Defendant informed Plaintiff of the proposed adjustments

and eliminations prior to January 1, 1982.

Although Plaintiff

expressed concern about the adjustments and changes at that time,
he took no affirmative action to collect the monies he now claims
were not paid as a result of the adjustments and changes.

At no

time during his employment between May 1, 1981 until January 31,
1983, did Plaintiff make a written or oral demand for the monies.
9.

On or about November 10, 1982, after eighteen months of

employment, Plaintiff accepted the new package of benefits and
terminated

his employment

as a result of the adjustments and

received the return to point of origin benefits, including a pro
rata

completion

incentive

payment,

which

under

his

original

employment conditions he would have been entitled to only upon
the completion of twenty-four months of employment.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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10.

In accepting the package of changes by a letter, dated

November 10, 1982, Plaintiff made no objection to any changes or
reductions in his pay and stated:
It has been a pleasure working with you in the Audit
Group here at Jubail and I would look forward to
working with you in the future. I appreciate your help
and consideration in this matter.

jj
;|

11.

Dpon Plaintiff's termination he acknowledged receipt of

!; his "net final wages from job" on a payroll sheet that expressly
• declares that Plaintiff's final check, which included the
II
, adjusted compensation, was to be drawn to the order of Plaintiff
•i

;: "in settlement of net final wages".
jj

12.

j; that

The

it

was

final
"in

check

that

settlement

Defendant
of

net

drew

expressly

final wages" for

stated
the

sum

j; specified and Plaintiff negotiated the check*
ii
I

ji

13*

In accordance with the changed compensation package, the

t\

I final

check

completion

included

and

Plaintiff

received

the

pro

rata

incentive, the full relocation allowance, and other

I; return to point of origin benefits even though Plaintiff had not
i worked twenty-four months.
!]
j'
Prom the foregoing findings

of

fact

the

Court makes

and

enters its
j;

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This

Court

has

subject

matter

jurisdiction

Plaintiff and Defendant Bechtel Civil and Minerals, Inc.

ft P R A T T
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2.
Plaintiff

Bechtel

Civil

and Minerals, Inc., is not

liable to

for any amounts claimed due because the acceptance

without reservation of the offer and the negotiation of the final
payment

of

completion

benefits

before

twenty-four

months of

employment constitutes an accord and satisfaction.
3.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court does not need to

decide Defendant's claim that Plaintiff is barred from pursuing
this action because he was an employee at will.
4.

Bechtel Civil and Minerals, Inc., is awarded its costs

in an amount to be taxed by the Cleric.
DATED this

2-4

day of June, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
H. DIXO^i^T-EV 1
CLE3X

%lOSdLOds^ DeaVEVConder
M
Sffl
* WMUCi

CtaputyCi**

District Court Judge

.sir:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to
be hand delivered on this Z 7 ~ day of June, 1986, to:
Gerald E. Nielson
Attorney for Plaintiff
3737 Honeycut Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

ft P R A T T

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•« •.^,--v.
FILED IN C L E R ^ u r r ^
Salt Lake County Utah

Steven E. Clyde (0686)
James L. Warlaumont (3386)
CLYDE & PRATT
Attorneys for Defendant
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-2516

JUN 27 1986

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

^ b

Qoft uo.QQq

ROBERT K. BENCH,
Plaintiff,

:

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

i

vs.

BECHTEL CIVIL & MINERALS, INC., :
Defendant.

:

Civil No. C-83-4178

TRIAL OP this action came on regularly before the Honorable
Dean E. Conder, District Judge, on May 2 7 , 1986, at the hour of
10:00 a.m. sitting without a jury.

Plaintiff was represented by

his counsel, Gerald Nielsen; Defendant was represented by its
counsel, Steven E. Clyde and James L. Warlaumont.

Thereupon, the

Court directed that this matter proceed on the issues joined by
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Defendant's Answer.

The Court

noted that Plaintiff and Defendant had appeared on May 6, 1986,
at the hour of 8:00 a.m. for Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and further noted that the parties agreed at that time
to rely on the evidence in the record, including affidavits and
Plaintiff's Deposition, as the evidence for trial.
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Plaintiff and

Defendant then proffered that evidence and argued the case.

The

Court, having considered the pleadings, the parties' stipulations
and the evidence, and having heretofore entered its findings of
fact

and

conclusions

of

law and being

fully

advised

in the

premises,
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 58(A)(b), U.R.C.P.,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendant Bechtel Civil and Minerals is hereby given and

granted judgment on the merits against Plaintiff Robert K. Bench,
no cause of action on his amended complaint.
2.

Defendant

Bechtel

Civil

and

Minerals

is awarded

its

costs of court against Plaintiff.
MADE AND ENTERED this 3-7

day of June, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
H. DIXOWJ*,ND>#Y

y\

^_^^

/_ .^^^Li-^

7

DeanE . Cdnder
frputya«**""" D i s t r i c t Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER & JUDGMENT to be hand delivered to:
Gerald E. Nielson
Attorney for Plaintiff
3737 Honeycut Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
on this 3 3 ^ day of June, 1986.
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Gerald E. Nielson (2412)
Attorney for Plaintiff
3737 Hbneycut Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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W THE THIED DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR S & T LAKE C
!>••••

DEPUTY

STATE OF UTAH

oVEmr

ROBERT K. BENCH,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff and appellant
vs.
BECHTEL CIVIL & MINERALS, INC.,

Civil No. C-83-4178

Defendant.and respondent

Robert K. Bench Plaintiff and appellant, herein, appeals from the order
and judgment of District Court Judge Dean C. Condor dated June 27, 1986,
to the Utah Supreme Court.
Dated this 22nd day of July 1986.

tW^JL
'Gerald E. Nielson
Attorney for appellant
Served a copy of the foregoing notice of appeal upon defendant respondent
by hand delivering a copy thereof to its attorney James L. Wkrlaumont this
22nd day of July 1986.
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